ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate stable state estimation and optimal attack schedule problems of the wireless Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) with two sensors under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. At each sampling time, a DoS attacker can conduct jamming attack in a certain frequency band to jam the two wireless packet dropping channels and cause packet dropouts. Due to the different frequency bandwidths of the two channels, one and only one channel is jammed by the jamming attack at each time step. A sufficient condition is presented to ensure the stability of the state estimation based on the Kalman filter. And the optimal attack schedule, which maximizes the expected average estimation error at the remote estimator, is proposed in the viewpoint of the attacker. Moreover, when there is a special intrusion detection system (IDS) at the estimator, the optimal attack schedule is also provided. A numerical simulation is given out to illustrate the effectiveness of the obtained results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the quicken development of wireless communication technologies, the applications of CPS have a wide spectrum, such as environmental monitoring, buildings automation, transportation systems, national defense, etc. In a typical CPS, there are plenty of sensors and different wireless channels which are unreliable and difficult to characterize. Note that each sensor is equipped with limited computing capability and communication resources. On account of these communication constraints, networked state estimation based on measurements received from sensors is a challenging work. Recently, this problem has received significant attention (see, e.g., [1] - [4] and the references therein). Till now, plenty of efforts have been made towards the estimation under a single sensor case [5] - [7] . However, the stability analysis of the state estimator according to measurements send from multiple sensors through a lossy network is more difficult. Sui et al. [8] study a networked state estimation problem for a spatially large linear system with a distributed array of sensors, each of which offers partial state measurements. Li et al. [9] consider multi-sensor transmis-
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Juntao Fei. sion power scheduling for remote state estimation to maximize the estimation performance subject to an energy constraint in this multi-player game under signal-to-interferenceplus-noise ratio model. Shi et al. [10] propose some conclusions of two sensors' periodic scheduling with limited resources.
Since cyber attacks can make the wireless CPS more and more vulnerable [11] - [14] , the security issues of networks have attracted a growing number of researchers from different perspectives recently. Multiple forms of malicious attacks have appeared, such as DoS attacks [11] , [12] , replay attacks [13] and false data injection attacks [14] . Jamming attacks, which is a particular of DoS attacks [15] , jam the communication channel to block the communication among systems' modules. There are many works related to the jamming attack in CPS [16] - [18] . Zhang et al. [11] investigate optimal attack scheduling against remote state estimation and prove that consecutive attacks maximize the expected average error covariance. Optimal jamming attacks and network defense policies in wireless sensor networks are considered in [16] . The work [17] focuses on the wireless jamming attack and examine, from the standpoint of the attacker, the problem of optimal attack schedule that causes the largest performance degradation of the remote station estimation system, subject to attacker's energy constraint. Furthermore, there usually equips an intrusion detector in wireless CPS to decrease the impact of unknown factors from environment changes or attacker's intrusions. In [19] , an attempt to exploit a low-consumption intrusion detection system to detect malicious attacks makes a lot of sense. Paper [20] presents a survey of the state-of-the-art in intrusion detection systems for wireless sensor networks.
In most existing works, they mainly study the attacking problem, such as optimal attack schedule under single sensor and single channel case. However, under multiple sensors and multiple channels case, the problem of stable state estimation and optimal attack schedule under DoS attack is a more difficult and interesting issue in CPS. Motivated by this, we consider a controlled plant monitored by two sensors, each sensor firstly runs Kalman filter to get the local state estimate, then transmits its estimated value to a remote process center over a wireless packet dropping channel. There is an DoS attacker, which can jam the two communication channels with some frequency bandwidth for degrading the remote estimation performance. Since the two sensors transmit their data packet using non-overlapping frequency bands, the attacker jams one and only one channel at each step. Under the jamming attack, we provide a stable state estimation and the optimal attack schedule of the wireless CPS with two sensors and two channels. In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) For the packet-loss wireless CPS with two sensors, we propose a stable remote state estimation based on the local state estimates (achieved by Kalman filter) under DoS attack. 2) From the viewpoint of the attacker, we present the optimal attack schedule which maximizes the expected average estimation error of the remote estimator. 3) When there exists a special IDS at the remote estimator, we also present an optimal attack schedule to avoid being detected by IDS standing on the attacker's perspective. The paper is organized as follows. First, the problem formulation and some preliminaries are provided in Section II. Section III shows the main results of this paper. Section IV illustrates the proposed results by a numerical example. At last, Section V provides the conclusions.
Notations: Z is the set of all integers. R is the set of all real numbers. R n denotes the n-dimensional Euclidean space and R n×m is the set of all real matrices with dimension n × m. I n×n refers to unit matrix with n × n dimension. · stands for either the Euclidean vector norm or the induced matrix 2-norm. S n + is the set of n by n positive semi-definite matrices. When X ∈ S n + , we simply write X 0; when X is positive definite, we write X > 0. Tr(X ) is the trace of X . The notation X ≥ Y (respectively, X > Y ), where X and Y are symmetric matrices, means that the matrix X − Y is positive semi-definite (respectively, positive definite).
the maximum (minimum) eigenvalue of a real symmetric matrix P. C n,τ = C([−τ, 0], R n ) denotes the Banach space of continuous functions mapping the interval [−τ, 0] into R n . Throughout the paper, the superscript 'T' stands for matrix transposition. For functions f ,
are the probability and expected value of X , respectively. The spectral radius of matrix X is presented by ρ(X ).
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The integrated system architecture is depicted in Fig. 1 . The states of the controlled plant are observed by two sensors. Each sensor runs a local state estimation (Kalman filter) and transmits the local estimates to a remote estimator over a wireless packet dropping communication channel. The remote estimator calculates the estimates of the states of the observed plant and its corresponding estimation error covariance matrix using the received local estimates. There is an DoS attacker which can launch jamming attack to the two wireless channels. Detailed introduction of each part of the system is given below. 
A. SYSTEM MODELS
Consider a discrete time-invariant dynamic system as follows:
where k ∈ Z is the time step, x k ∈ R n is state of the system and ζ k is a white Gaussian noise with covariance Q 0. x 0 is the initial state, which is also assumed to be a zero-mean Gaussian variable with covariance P 0 > 0. Moreover, we assume that the pair (A, √ Q) is stabilizable [21] - [24] . The states of the system are monitored by two sensors as shown in Fig. 1 , i.e.,
where y
is the measurement noise with zero-mean and covariance R i > 0, i = 1, 2. For problem tractability, (A, C 1 ) and (A, C 2 ) are assumed observable [21] . In addition,
k and v (2) k are assumed mutually independent.
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Firstly, the local Kalman estimator is developed under the two sensors as shown below. Denotex
k|k as the i-th sensor's local state estimate and its corresponding estimation error covariance, i.e.,
According to the standard Kalman filter, it follows that
where the initial conditions arex
k|k converges to a steady-state value at an exponential speed [10] , the local estimation is assumed to have ideal convergence. The steady value of {P
B. PACKET DROPPING CHANNELS
In the concerned networked system, the communication between each sensor and the remote estimator is through a packet dropping wireless channel. As the wireless channels are unreliable, their transmitted data packets may be randomly lost. To describe the packet loss process, we define a binary random process γ
, the transmitted data of channel i is successfully received by the remote estimator at time k, and γ (i) k = 0 if the packet is lost. When the data packet is lost, the remote estimator may fail to generate a stable state estimation. Assume Pr[γ
C. JAMMING ATTACK
There exists an attacker, which is assumed capable to conduct jamming attack on the sever to jam the communication channels between the sensors and the remote estimator and to deteriorate the remote estimation quality, therefore causing the data packet dropouts. The two independent sensors find transmission opportunities and sent their data packet based on non-overlapping frequency bands [25] , and thus they do not interfere with each other. Since we focus on the optimal attack schedule problem under multi-sensor and multi-channel case, the attacker is assumed to have enough energy to jam the channels for the whole considered time. Moreover, notice that the attacker's wireless radio can only operate on one of the two channels at each time step, there is one and only one channel jammed by the attacker at each time. To model the attacker's attack decisions, we define a variable λ (i) k = 1, which means that channel i is jammed by the attacker at time k, otherwise λ
There is one and only one channel jammed by the attacker at time k, therefore, λ
From above, we know that λ
When channel i is jammed by the jamming attack, it's transmitted sensory data will be dropped with probability λ i , i = 1, 2.
1) AVERAGE ERROR
Consider time slot [0, t], for a given attack schedule λ, define J a (λ) as the average expected estimation error covariance, i.e.,
The objectives of this paper are 1) to develop an algorithm to recursively compute the estimate at the remote estimator using local estimate of x k for system (1)- (2), and to establish a stability condition under which the expectation of the state estimation error covariance matrix is bounded, i.e.,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random process λ (i) k , i = 1, 2; 2) to solve the following problem in the viewpoint of the attacker:
Problem 1:
subject to λ
where = {0, 1} t is the set of all possible attack schedules.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we first design a stable remote state estimation, then analyze the optimal attack schedule for Problem 1, and at last find the optimal attack schedule under intrusion detection system.
A. STABLE REMOTE STATE ESTIMATION
In this section, we use the local estimate of x k to compute the remote estimatex k and its corresponding estimation error covariance matrix P k of the remote estimator. For the remote estimator, the available information set at time k is F k = {(γ
k|k )}. Denotex k and P k as the remote estimator's state estimate and the corresponding estimation error covariance based on F k , i.e.,
We design the following estimation algorithm for the remote estimator.
Estimator 1:
The estimatex k and its corresponding estimation error covariance P k are recursively computed bŷ
where w i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, are the weights of the local information,
Then we analyze the stability of Estimator 1 and obtain the following result.
Theorem 1: Consider system (1)- (2) and (A,
Proof: From (16), it follows that
k|k ] is stable before it being transmitted to the remote estimator, we can replace it byP (i) . Then we have
If α i ρ 2 (A) < 1, we have E[P s i (k|k)] is bounded. Due to
we know that E[P k ] is bounded, which finishes the proof.
B. OPTIMAL ATTACK SCHEDULE
Next we are to find the optimal attack schedule for Problem 1. From above, we have
and
where and attack on channel 2 with probability 1 − λ * 1 . Otherwise, the optimal attack schedule for Problem 1 is as following (a) consecutive attack on channel 1 from time 1 to time t if G ≥ 0; (b) consecutive attack on channel 2 from time 1 to time t if G < 0, where
where
(1)
Proof: From (24), we know that Tr[J a (λ)] can be rewritten as a polynomial of λ 1 . Thus we want to find optimal λ * 1 such that (24) with respect to λ 1 as follows:
If there exists λ * 1 ∈ R such that
hold, which means that λ * 1 maximizes Tr[J a (λ)], then the optimal attack schedule that solves Problem 1 is attack on channel 1 with probability λ * 1 and attack on channel 2 with probability 1 − λ * 1 . Otherwise, λ * 1 = 1 or λ * 1 = 0. Denote
which equals to the average error of the case of λ * 1 = 1 subtracting it of the case of λ * 1 = 0. Therefore, when there does not exist λ * 1 satisfying (32), it follows that λ * 1 = 1 if G ≥ 0 and λ * 1 = 0 if G < 0, i.e., the optimal attack schedule that solves Problem 1 is as following (a) consecutive attack on channel 1 from time 1 to time t if G ≥ 0; (b) consecutive attack on channel 2 from time 1 to time t if G < 0. The proof is completed.
C. OPTIMAL ATTACK SCHEDULES WITH INTRUSION DETECTION
In Problem 1, we assume that the channel is perfect and there is no defensive measure. However, in practice, an intrusion detector as shown in Fig. 2 is often designed at the remote estimator as a first step to reduce the effectiveness of unknown factors from environment changes or attacker's intrusion. Some researchers regard the packet reception rate (PRR) at the receiver side as the criteria for intrusion detection. We also consider the PRR. PRR is defined as the rate of packets reception that are successfully received by the FIGURE 2. System architecture with intrusion detection. VOLUME 7, 2019 remote estimator compared to the number of packets that have been transmitted by the sensor.
For a given length of a time window τ , PRR = σ τ , where σ is the number of the successfully receipted packets in the time window. The attacker will be found by the detector when the PRR is very small, and therefore, the detector will trigger an alarm to alert the remote estimator. To guarantee the data packets can be successfully delivered to the remote estimator, the sensors can adopt channel hopping technology [26] . In our case, the alarm is assumed to be triggered when
0 , where PRR (i) is the packet reception rate of channel i, PRR (i) 0 is a given alarm bound against channel i, i = 1, 2.
Let σ
In order to ensure that the estimator can not detect the attack action, any attack schedule with at most d i times consecutive attack to channel i, i.e.,
In fact, the attacker can collect the information of the time window τ and threshold PRR (i) 0 by eavesdropping the transmission channels before launching attack. Standing on the viewpoint of the attacker and for the sake of not being detected by intrusion detection systems, we consider Problem 1 with an additional constraint, i.e., Problem 2:
subject to
Based on the conclusions in section 3.2, we acquire the following result.
Theorem 3: Consider system (1)- (2) and (A, C i ), i = 1, 2 are observable.
< 0, then the optimal attack schedule that solves Problem 2 is attack on channel 1 with probability λ * 1 and attack on channel 2 with probability 1 − λ * 1 , moreover, the consecutive attack times to channel i is less than d i in time window τ , i = 1, 2. Otherwise, the optimal attack schedule for Problem 2 is as following Proof: For Problem 2, we know that any attack schedule with at most d i times consecutive attack on channel i to avoid being detected by the remote estimator. Combining with Theorem 2, we obtain Theorem 3.
IV. EXAMPLE
In this section, we give one example to show how to apply the results proposed in this paper.
Consider system (1)- (2) with
k and v (2) k having zero mean and variance Q = I 2×2 , R 1 = I 2×2 , R 2 = 2I 2×2 . Moreover, we may take t = 20, w 1 = 0.7, w 2 = 0.3, λ 1 = 0.6, λ 2 = 0.4, γ 1 = 0.7 and γ 2 = 0.6.
It is easy to verify that (A, C 1 ), (A, C 2 ) are observable and (A, √ Q) is stabilizable. By using Matlab dare toolbox, we can get thatP . Fig. 3 is the response of the trace of E[P k ]. It is obvious that E[P k ] is bounded. Based on Theorem 2, we obtain that the maximum of Tr[J a (λ)] is 3.4957 and the optimal value is λ * 1 = 0.49 by By the calculation, we get that the trace of the average expected estimation error covariance of 9 times attack on channel 1 and 11 times attack on channel 2 is 3.4941 and it of 10 times attack on channel 1 and 10 times attack on channel 2 is 3.4956. Therefore, the optimal attack schedule for Problem 1 is 10 times attack on channel 1 and 10 times attack on channel 2. For t = 20, we take τ = 20, PRR detected by the remote estimator, any attack schedule is with at most 15 times consecutive attack to channel 1 or 16 times consecutive attack to channel 2. From above, we know that the optimal attack schedule for Problem 1 is 10 times attack on channel 1 and 10 times attack on channel 2. This schedule will not be detected by the remote estimator, hence, it is also the optimal attack schedule for Problem 2.
Thus according to Theorem 1, it follows that E[P
k ] is bounded since λ i (1 − γ i )ρ 2 (A) < 1, i = 1, 2.0 = 0.25, PRR(1)
V. CONCLUSION
The stable remote estimation method and the optimal jamming attack schedule of the multi-channel CPS under DoS attack are considered in this paper. At each time step, the DoS attacker can jam one and only one communication channel. We provide a sufficient condition to ensure that the designed state estimation is stable, and the optimal attack schedule which maximizes system's remote average expected estimation error covariance. In addition, we also present the optimal attack schedule when there is a special IDS at the remote estimator. Example illustrates that the acquired results are practicable and validate in analyzing state estimation and optimal attack schedule of the wireless CPS under DoS attack. The problem of the optimal attack schedule when the attacker has energy constraints is left as our future work. VOLUME 7, 2019 
